Print Email Facebook Twitter Reciprocation Effort Games Title Reciprocation Effort Games Author Polevoy, G. (Universiteit van Amsterdam) de Weerdt, M.M. (TU Delft Algorithmics) Contributor Verheij, Bart (editor) Wiering, Marco (editor) Date 2017-11-08 Abstract Consider people dividing their time and eort between friends, interest clubs, and reading seminars. These are all reciprocalinteractions, and the reciprocal processes determine the utilities of the agents from these interactions. To advise on ecient eort division, we determine the existence and eciency of the Nash equilibria of the game of allocating eort to such projects. When no minimum eort is required to receive reciprocation, an equilibrium always exists, and if acting is either easy to everyone, or hard to everyone, then every equilibrium is socially optimal. If a minimal eort is needed to participate, we prove that not contributing at all is an equilibrium, and for two agents, also a socially optimal equilibrium can be found. Next, we extend the model,assuming that the need to react requires more than the agents can contribute to acting, rendering the reciprocation imperfect. We prove that even then, each interaction converges and the corresponding game has an equilibrium. To reference this document use: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:19fedb45-1050-4b6f-b0a6-24f89aaef142 ISBN 978-94-034-0299-4 Source BNAIC 2017 pre-proceedings: 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence Event 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017-11-08 → 2017-11-09, Groningen, Netherlands Part of collection Institutional Repository Document type conference paper Rights © 2017 G. Polevoy, M.M. de Weerdt Files PDF seg_recip.pdf 430.42 KB Close viewer /islandora/object/uuid:19fedb45-1050-4b6f-b0a6-24f89aaef142/datastream/OBJ/view