Analyzing and improving client-contractor relationships at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol - an agency theory and transaction cost theory approach

Large infrastructure promotors progressively outsource parts of their organization to contractors. For them, outsourcing brings along a dependency on contractors for the realization of their objectives. With control over outsourced processes declining, these large organizations risk failure to capitalize on the economic and ecologic potential of outsourced processes. A theoretical framework based on agency theory and transaction cost theory is constructed that can be used to analyze and improve the cooperation of organization with their infrastructure contractors. The theoretical framework is operationalized to allow for observations from a case study at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol (SG). The topic of the case study is the governance of construction materials. SG appears to coordinate construction materials predominantly using behavior-based mechanisms. Comparing this with the prescribed way contracting by the theoretical framework, it is determined that this cooperation is inefficient. Recommendations for SG include adopting an approach where the contractor is freer in its construction material decision making. This harnesses the vast market knowledge as well as the economic and ecologic potential of construction materials on the airport. Recommendations for further research include extending the theoretical framework with additional theory and the use of additional cases of similar outsourced processes.

Subject

client-contractor
relationship
agency theory
transaction cost theory
construction materials

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master thesis

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