Print Email Facebook Twitter Information Asymmetry, Lease Incentives, and the Role of Advisors in the Market for Commercial Real Estate Title Information Asymmetry, Lease Incentives, and the Role of Advisors in the Market for Commercial Real Estate Author Dröes, M. (Universiteit van Amsterdam) Biermans, B.O. Koppels, P.W. (TU Delft Real Estate Management) Date 2016 Abstract Using a unique transactions dataset, this paper examines the determinants of lease incentives in the Amsterdam office market. The study focusses on the type of landlord involved (institutional/privately owned) and whether the tenant or landlord used an advisor to help them with the transaction. The results show that an institutional landlord, ceteris paribus, offers 11 percentage points more incentives than a private owner. In addition, a landlord who uses the services of an advisor pays 11 percentage points less incentives. An advisor at the side of the tenant increases incentives by 13 percentage points. The results in this paper highlight the crucial role of market information, information asymmetry, and bargaining in the market for commercial real estate. Subject commercial real estateoffice marketlease incentivesadvisorinformation asymmetry To reference this document use: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:76016efb-f3a4-477e-a0ac-97e11a8d45e4 Source American Real Estate and Urban Association International Conference Event 2016 AREUEA International Conference, 2016-07-06 → 2016-07-08, Europe, Alicante, Spain Part of collection Institutional Repository Document type conference paper Rights © 2016 M. Dröes, B.O. Biermans, P.W. Koppels Files PDF Information_Asymmetry_....pdf 663.26 KB Close viewer /islandora/object/uuid:76016efb-f3a4-477e-a0ac-97e11a8d45e4/datastream/OBJ/view