Print Email Facebook Twitter On Stackelberg and Inverse Stackelberg Games & Their Applications in the Optimal Toll Design Problem, the Energy Markets Liberalization Problem, and in the Theory of Incentives Title On Stackelberg and Inverse Stackelberg Games & Their Applications in the Optimal Toll Design Problem, the Energy Markets Liberalization Problem, and in the Theory of Incentives Author Stankova, K. Contributor Olsder, G.J. (promotor) Bliemer, M.C.J. (promotor) Faculty Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science Department Delft Institute of Applied mathematics Date 2009-02-02 Abstract This thesis studies the so-called inverse Stackelberg games, that are new in the world of game theory, their properties, and their applications in the optimal toll design problem, the energy markets liberalization problem, and in the theory of incentives. Subject game theoryStackelberg gamesinverse Stackelberg gamesoptimal toll design problemtheory of incentivesenergy markets liberalization problem To reference this document use: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:8a7342eb-cf40-459b-8adc-fa4806f4e024 Publisher Next Generation Infrastructures Foundation Embargo date 2009-11-09 ISBN 9789079787036 Part of collection Institutional Repository Document type doctoral thesis Rights (c) 2009 Stankova, K. Files PDF thesis_stankova_ngi.pdf 1.08 MB Close viewer /islandora/object/uuid:8a7342eb-cf40-459b-8adc-fa4806f4e024/datastream/OBJ/view