Print Email Facebook Twitter Influence of Reputation on Resistance against Bad Agents in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Title Influence of Reputation on Resistance against Bad Agents in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Author Knops, Per (TU Delft Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science) Contributor Yorke-Smith, N. (mentor) Venkatesha Prasad, R.R. (graduation committee) Degree granting institution Delft University of Technology Programme Computer Science and Engineering Project CSE3000 Research Project Date 2021-06-28 Abstract In the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma players can take advantage of other players. This has no drawbacks for the player after that game, since it is assumed that the players have no memory. When reputation is introduced however, a single game of the Prisoner’s Dilemma can influence other games. In this paper research is done on how reputation can influence the population of a spatial Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. This is then extended by adding groups. While in total the amount of ’bad players’ decreases and the amount of ’good players’ increases, the cooperation does not always increase. Subject IPDReputationPrisoner’s Dilemma To reference this document use: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:c3580c40-d103-4519-bc0e-c77a6d03f3de Part of collection Student theses Document type bachelor thesis Rights © 2021 Per Knops Files PDF Final_research_paper.pdf 173.95 KB Close viewer /islandora/object/uuid:c3580c40-d103-4519-bc0e-c77a6d03f3de/datastream/OBJ/view