Auctions with Arbitrary Deals

Auctions with Arbitrary Deals

Máhr, T.
De Weerdt, M.M.

Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science

Software Computer Technology

2007-12-31

To come to a deal, a bargaining process can sometimes take a long time. An auction may be a faster, but existing auction models cannot cope with situations where money is not an issue, or where it is difficult to express the utility of all participants in a monetary domain. We propose a modified Vickrey auction based only on preferences over the possible bids. This approach also allows for situations where a bid is not just a price or some fixed set of attributes, but can be any possible offer. We prove that in this flexible, generalized setting, the Vickrey mechanism is still incentive compatible and results in a Pareto-efficient solution.

http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:c7173dae-0756-4ab5-81e8-fbaa6dc21397

Springer

https://doi.org/doi:10.1007/978-3-540-74481-8_5

Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 4659, 2007; authors version

Institutional Repository

book chapter

(c) 2007 Springer
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com