The research presented in the thesis contains a part of the ongoing effort to improve the situation of the Dutch construction sector. For at least the last decade, a number of measures known as integrated contracting has been heralded as the solution for many problems in the Dutch construction industry. One of the main reasons for integrated contracting is to stimulate suppliers adopting innovative solutions. The innovative solutions can lead to bids with a lower price, more value or both. However, not all possibilities of the integrated contracting philosophy are utilised, due to the dominance of the lowest price award mechanism. Effective integrated contracting calls for the application of the Economically Most Advantageous Tender (EMAT) award mechanism, which increases the chance for bids with a better value price ratio. However, the application of the EMAT award mechanism is not widespread, because it is perceived as more complicated than the traditional lowest price award mechanism. The main barrier for the implementation of EMAT is the lack of information on how to formulate suitable EMAT award mechanisms, leading to the main question of this research: Which EMAT award mechanisms are suitable for the Dutch construction industry? The research takes an empirical approach in order answer this question. First, suitability requirements are formulated. Then, information is collected on EMAT award mechanisms that are applied in the procurement practice. The matching of the two leads to an overview of suitable EMAT award mechanism elements that are then combined into a decision tree. Several EMAT types were encountered during this investigation. In order to analyse these different types, the value price model is developed. The value price model is a graphical representation of a procurement situation. Two preference systems are distinguished namely a system that bases preference on the highest value price ratio and a system that bases preference on the highest difference between value and price. The introduction of several constraints in the value price model defines the procurement space. Furthermore, the strategies of ‘price minimisation’, ‘value maximisation’ and ‘value price optimisation’ can be represented in the model. Based on this model, the concept of ‘bidding freedom’ is introduced. The bidding freedom is the share of the theoretically maximum possible added value compared to the price of the theoretical most expensive competitive bid. Several requirements determine whether an EMAT award mechanism is suitable or not. Legal requirements are ‘non-discrimination’, ‘proportionality’ and ‘transparency’. Practical requirements are ‘sufficient bidding freedom’, ‘simplicity and elegance’ and the safeguarding of traditional project management requirements. The properties of twenty-four EMAT award mechanisms that were applied in practice are presented. Four main types are distinguished; the point system (six cases), the price correction system (eleven cases), the ratio system (two cases) and the value maximisation system (one case). Several developments are identified. The average “bidding freedom” is about 30% for cases from the civil sector and about 20% for the commercial sector, amounting to a combined bidding freedom of about 25%. In the civil sector, the most used award criterion is a process quality criterion, i.e. ‘quality of the project management plan’. Most used award criterion in the commercial sector is ‘functionality of the built object’, which is a product quality criterion. The ‘value minus price’ system and the ‘value price ratio’ system are both considered suitable. The design contest system should be discouraged. There is a preference for the price correction system over the point system when one chooses for a ‘value minus price’ system. Elements that should not be applied are weighed prices, discrete price-point relationships, discrete performance-money relationships, comparative score determination and price dependant value determination. Most striking observations were 1) the sudden appearance of ratio systems at the end of 2007, 2) the conclusion that procurement practice applies EMAT elements or systems that should be discouraged, and 3) the observation that the choice between procurement profit and profitability is not clear. Based on this research, procurers are recommended to use the developed EMAT award mechanism decision tree and to use the value price model to present results. Furthermore it will be rewarding for them to keep the EMAT award mechanism as simple as possible and to take eventual budgetary consequences of EMAT into account. Also, procurers are recommended to use curved performance-money relationships when appropriate and to manage knowledge. Finally, it is recommended that in the phases preceding the award phase enough design freedom is left, in order to keep awarding based on EMAT useful. Traditional construction companies operating in markets with integrated contracts are recommended to develop themselves towards integrated suppliers in order to remain competitive. Recommended topics for further investigation are the influence of the application of EMAT on the success of projects and on the reliability of bids. Furthermore it can be worthwhile to investigate whether the award criteria can also be used in other phases of the construction lifecycle. Finally the possibilities of streamlining and objectifying the award phase by the use of advanced ICT applications are interesting topics for further investigation. The policy of several Dutch governmental agencies to apply integrated contracting promises a bright future for the EMAT award mechanism.