Print Email Facebook Twitter Of Mechanism Design and Multiagent Planning Title Of Mechanism Design and Multiagent Planning Author Van der Krogt, R.P.J. De Weerdt, M.M. Zhang, Y. Faculty Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science Department Software Computer Technology Date 2008-07-21 Abstract Multiagent planning methods are concerned with planning by and for a group of agents. If the agents are selfinterested, they may be tempted to lie in order to obtain an outcome that is more rewarding for them. We therefore study the multiagent planning problem from a mechanism design perspective, showing how to incentivise agents to be truthful. We prove that the well-known truthful VCG mechanism is not always truthful in the context of optimal planning, and present a modification to fix this. Finally, we present some (domain-dependent) poly-time planning algorithms using this fix that maintain truthfulness in spite of their non-optimality. To reference this document use: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:f75f742b-117c-412a-9f23-00006eb4219a Publisher IOS Press Source http://www.iospress.nl/book/ecai-2008/ Source ECAI 2008: Proceedings of the 18th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, University of Patras, Greece, 21-26 July 2008; authors version Part of collection Institutional Repository Document type conference paper Rights (c) 2008 IOS PressThe Author(s) Files PDF ecai081.pdf 311.77 KB Close viewer /islandora/object/uuid:f75f742b-117c-412a-9f23-00006eb4219a/datastream/OBJ/view