Print Email Facebook Twitter The profitable influence of lease incentives for new office developments: A research on the phenomenon of office real estate developments (out)competing existing assets on effective rent levels without loss of quality Title The profitable influence of lease incentives for new office developments: A research on the phenomenon of office real estate developments (out)competing existing assets on effective rent levels without loss of quality Author Harding, B.T. Contributor Remøy, H.T. (mentor) Koppels, P.W. (mentor) Faculty Architecture Department Real Estate & Housing Programme Real Estate Management Date 2012-10-31 Abstract Dutch developers are thought to have been able to outcompete the owners of existing office space on rental pricing (the phenomenon). For tenants it was more inexpensive to move to newly proposed (not yet existent) office space than to remain where they are, or move to other existing office space. Three theoretical reasons were identified for the phenomenon to exist: 1) rent price lagging of existing assets to new market information, 2) lower production costs for the new development and 3) the creation of margin between development costs and asset selling price. Especially the latter has had influence on the phenomenon's existence. Three main aspects are identified for the creation of margin: 1) A period of Yield Compression (2004-2008) enabled great selling prices to be obtained. Thereby margin was created. It also led to a decrease in financing costs and allowed for the neglect of given lease incentives by developers, 2) the use of the normative residual land value method enabled margin to exist altogether and allowed for additional margin to be created, and 3) the use of Lease Incentives by the developer has shown to have an amplifying effect: Profit Sharing/the High-Low Method effectively lowers the rent level of the tenant by making maximum use of the created margin. Sources used: literature, expert interviews, key-actor interviews, dataset analysis and sensitivity analysis. Subject incentivelease incentiveeffective rentcontract rentmarket renthigh-low methodhoog-laagprice laggingyield compressionreal estateofficevacancynormative residual land valueresidual land valueresidual land value methodmunicipal competition To reference this document use: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:7479f3ec-c1ad-4076-be86-d4c02e548d6c Embargo date 2012-10-31 Part of collection Student theses Document type master thesis Rights (c) 2012 Harding, B.T. Files PDF BTHarding_-_FINAL_REPORT_ ... ndices.pdf 2.75 MB PDF BTHarding_-_REFLECTION.pdf 175.09 KB PDF BT_Harding_-_Graduation_Poster.pdf 2.48 MB PDF Bram_T._Harding_-_RESEARC ... OPOSAL.pdf 1.74 MB PDF BT_Harding_-_Presentation.pdf 538.68 KB Close viewer /islandora/object/uuid:7479f3ec-c1ad-4076-be86-d4c02e548d6c/datastream/OBJ5/view