Print Email Facebook Twitter Incentivizing Cooperation in P2P File Sharing: Indirect Interaction as an Incentive to Seed Title Incentivizing Cooperation in P2P File Sharing: Indirect Interaction as an Incentive to Seed Author Noroozian, A. De Weerdt, M.M. Witteveen, C. Faculty Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science Department Software Computer Technology Date 2012-06-04 Abstract The fundamental problem with P2P networks is that quality of service depends on altruistic resource sharing by participating peers. Many peers freeride on the generosity of others. Current solutions like sharing ratio enforcement and reputation systems are complex, exploitable, inaccurate or unfair at times. The need to design scalable mechanisms that incentivize cooperation is evident. We focus on BitTorrent as the most popular P2P file sharing application and introduce an extension which we refer to as the indirect interaction mechanism (IIM). With IIM BitTorrent peers are able to barter pieces of different files (indirect interaction). We provide novel game theoretical models of BitTorrent and the IIM mechanism and demonstrate through analysis and simulations that IIM improves BitTorrent performance. We conclude that IIM is a practical solution to the fundamental problem of incentivizing cooperation in P2P networks. Subject Incentives for CooperationPeer to peer coordination To reference this document use: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:af4e49ad-3943-4a3f-9b91-6e233cbb21cf Source ADMI 2012: Proceedings of the Eighth International Workshop on Agents and Data Mining Interaction, Valencia, Spain, 4-5 June 2012 Part of collection Institutional Repository Document type conference paper Rights (c) 2012 The Author(s) Files PDF arman12.pdf 415.49 KB Close viewer /islandora/object/uuid:af4e49ad-3943-4a3f-9b91-6e233cbb21cf/datastream/OBJ/view