Title
Designing virus-resistant networks: A game-formation approach
Author
Trajanovski, S. (TU Delft Network Architectures and Services)
Kuipers, F.A. (TU Delft Network Architectures and Services)
Hayel, Yezekael (University of Avignon)
Altman, Eitan (INRIA Sophia Antipolis)
Van Mieghem, P.F.A. (TU Delft Network Architectures and Services)
Contributor
Ohta, Y. (editor)
Sampei, M. (editor)
Astolfi, A. (editor)
Date
2015-12
Abstract
Forming, in a decentralized fashion, an optimal network topology while balancing multiple, possibly conflicting objectives like cost, high performance, security and resiliency to viruses is a challenging endeavor. In this paper, we take a game-formation approach to network design where each player, for instance an autonomous system in the Internet, aims to collectively minimize the cost of installing links, of protecting against viruses, and of assuring connectivity. In the game, minimizing virus risk as well as connectivity costs results in sparse graphs. We show that the Nash Equilibria are trees that, according to the Price of Anarchy (PoA), are close to the global optimum, while the worst-case Nash Equilibrium and the global optimum may significantly differ for small infection rate and link installation cost. Moreover, the types of trees, in both the Nash Equilibria and the optimal solution, depend on the virus infection rate, which provides new insights into how viruses spread: for high infection rate τ, the path graph is the worst- and the star graph is the best-case Nash Equilibrium. However, for small and intermediate values of τ, trees different from the path and star graphs may be optimal.
Subject
Games
Nash equilibrium
Viruses (medical)
Network topology
Peer-to-peer computing
Stability analysis
Security
To reference this document use:
http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:de2b6cde-c782-4063-a776-1f5902e631b9
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2015.7402216
Publisher
IEEE, Piscataway, NJ
ISBN
978-1-4799-7886-1
Source
Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE 54th Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC'15
Event
54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2015, 2015-12-15 → 2015-12-18, Osaka, Japan
Part of collection
Institutional Repository
Document type
conference paper
Rights
© 2015 S. Trajanovski, F.A. Kuipers, Yezekael Hayel, Eitan Altman, P.F.A. Van Mieghem